Bypassing LSA Protection in Userland
In 2018, James Forshaw published an article in which he briefly mentioned a trick that could be used to inject arbitrary code into a PPL as an administrator. However, I feel like this post did not ...
In 2018, James Forshaw published an article in which he briefly mentioned a trick that could be used to inject arbitrary code into a PPL as an administrator. However, I feel like this post did not ...
When it comes to protecting against credentials theft on Windows, enabling LSA Protection (a.k.a. RunAsPPL) on LSASS may be considered as the very first recommendation to implement. But do you real...
A few days ago, I released Perfusion, an exploit tool for the RpcEptMapper registry key vulnerability that I discussed in my previous post. Here, I want to discuss the strategy I opted for when I d...
If you follow me on Twitter, you probably know that I developed my own Windows privilege escalation enumeration script - PrivescCheck - which is a sort of updated and extended version of the famous...
There was a weird bug in the DotNet Core Toolset installer that allowed any local user to elevate their privileges to SYSTEM. In this blog post, I want to share the details of this bug that was sil...
Here is my writeup about CVE-2020-1170, an elevation of privilege bug in Windows Defender. Finding a vulnerability in a security-oriented product is quite satisfying. Though, there was nothing grou...
This is a kind of follow-up to my last post, in which I discussed a technique that can be used for elevating privileges to SYSTEM when you have impersonation capabilities. In the last part, I expla...
Over the last few years, tools such as RottenPotato, RottenPotatoNG or Juicy Potato have made the exploitation of impersonation privileges on Windows very popular among the offensive security commu...
Whenever a “new” DLL hijacking / planting trick is posted on Twitter, it generates a lot of comments. “It’s not a vulnerability!” or “There is a lot of hijackable DLLs on Windows…” are the most com...
What if I told you that all editions of Windows Server, from 2008R2 to 2019, are prone to a DLL Hijacking in the %PATH% directories? What if I also told you that the impacted service runs as NT AUT...